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INTRODUCTION
This report contains the proceedings from a workshop 
organised by the LSE Middle East Centre and led by 
Dr Kristian Coates Ulrichsen which examined demogra-
phy in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The 
event took place on 24 January 2014 under the Cha-
tham House Rule1 and hosted six speakers from the 
Gulf and Europe who addressed the shifting dynamics 
of the study of demographic issues in the GCC tates. 
Speakers and participants were drawn from academic 
institutions, think-tanks, governments, and commercial 
enterprises from across the Gulf and Europe. Issues for 
discussion included the following: 
• Challenges to the research of demographic issues 
arising from the lack of available statistics 
• Perceptions, emotions, and reality of the demographic 
imbalance on the ground in the GCC states
• Sponsorship as a demographic policy in the GCC states
• The evolving role of non-nationals in the GCC states
• The role of business actors in the GCC states demo-
graphics debate
• Interaction of labour and politics (with a focus on Bahrain) 
Recent developments across the six GCC states2 have 
demonstrated the complexity of connections between 
demography, labour markets, and more intangible con-
cepts of identity and citizenship. Large-scale deporta-
tions of expatriate workers have taken place in Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait alongside renewed efforts to increase 
the proportion of nationals in labour markets. Amid 
the wider regional Arab Spring upheaval, questions of 
security and identity have increasingly preoccupied the 
minds both of decision-makers and publics alike. The 
‘demographic imbalance’ in the GCC States has thus 
become a value-laden frame of reference that has, in 
recent years, expanded and gained popular currency 
in the GCC states. This encompasses not only issues 
of labour market (in)-efficiency and conventional politi-
cal-security challenges, but also perceived socio-cultur-
al threats among national populations.
1  Meaning that information may be used but neither the identity 
nor the affiliation of the participants may be revealed.
2 The Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in 1981 and 
consists of the six member-states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
RELIABILITY OF DATA AND STATISTICS
Migration in the GCC states is unique and constitutes 
one of the most pronounced and visible ‘peculiari-
ties’ that set the region apart from almost every other 
national and regional polity in the world.  Ground-break-
ing research has been conducted in recent years on 
various aspects of the demographic debate in the GCC, 
and important works have appeared that have added 
depth and nuance to the literature. Yet, the raw data 
available to practitioners and researchers in (and on) the 
GCC remains very limited by comparison to internation-
al standards. Many existing statistics are fragmentary 
and scattered across multiple and sometimes overlap-
ping sources while large gaps remain; such as infor-
mation relating to the number and presence of illegal 
immigrants and the ‘safety nets’ that have emerged to 
sustain them. In the UAE, for example, undocumented 
migrants have developed their own insurance and edu-
cation systems. It is thus necessary to connect the vari-
ous perspectives on demography and migration, includ-
ing the legal, economic, and labour market aspects, and 
assess how they interact as they overlap and inform 
each other. Another avenue for further research is 
assessing patterns of change in labour-sending states 
alongside the countries of destination, as is the ability 
to set current developments within the context of his-
torical trends in migration to the GCC states. 
Much of the extant data on migration has been pro-
duced by the GCC states themselves. The challenges 
lie in obtaining access to the data and assessing the 
quality, reliability and indeed the compatibility of the fig-
ures that have been generated:
• National data in itself is insufficient and must be aug-
mented with international sources such as the United 
Nations and its specialised agencies, for example the 
International Labour Organisation and the World Bank. 
• Publicly-available information should be brought to-
gether and delivered through a more efficient and 
centralised platform. 
• Researchers and officials must also be able to identi-
fy and take into account the political and vested inter-
ests when analysing the available information and to 
develop ways of making the data available to a wider 
audience in easily-digestible forms. 
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A recent venture in this regard is the Gulf Labour Mar-
kets and Migration portal, an international programme 
launched in 2013 as a joint initiative by the Gulf Research 
Centre and the Migration Policy Centre.3 
PERCEPTIONS VS. REALITY IN THE  
‘DEMOGRAPHIC IMBALANCE’
There are, nevertheless, significant lacunae in the 
existing data which render the nature and scale of the 
‘demographic imbalance’ hard to quantify. In practice, 
three factors make the statistics on demography in the 
GCC unreliable:
• A lack of public accountability or collaboration within 
and among the various national and regional institu-
tions or government ministries collecting information.
• A culture of secrecy surrounding the actual figures col-
lected through mechanisms such as census returns 
or internal surveys conducted within public agencies. 
• A shortfall in reliable data on ‘legacy migrants’ such 
as hajj over-stayers in Saudi Arabia, illegal migration 
along largely-uncontrolled borders in Oman, and 
those who simply never registered as migrants after 
national boundaries were fixed in the 1960s and 1970s. 
One participant described at length the lack of institu-
tional cooperation on all aspects of population strategy 
and management in the GCC states and ascribed this 
to a weakness in maturity and a lack of consistent policy 
objectives among the different ministries and agencies 
involved. This makes it problematic for many institutions 
within the GCC to implement rules such as pertaining 
to labour nationalisation that require cross-government 
policy coordination. An example is the nitaqat4 system 
in Saudi Arabia, which not only faces difficulties in align-
ing the interests of the various political and business 
actors involved but also encounters auditing challenges 
posed by the large number of undocumented migrants 
in the country. 
Compounding the issue is the fact that emotions and 
sensitivities run high around demographic issues and 
imbalances, fuelled in part by the way the issues are 
portrayed in political debate and media coverage – 
even though the lack of openness surrounding official 
3  See http://gulfmigration.eu/ for further information on the Gulf 
Labour Markets and Migration project. 
4  The nitaqat system, launched in 2011 in Saudi Arabia, offers 
a grading structure for companies based on their nationalisation 
performance by calculating the percentage of Saudi employees in 
comparison to non-citizens.
statistics means many people are not aware of actual 
migration statistics and data. A particular trigger of 
citizens’ anxiety about migration levels concerns the 
growing number of jobs, and perceived benefits, that 
go to migrants, while others relate to more intangible 
concerns for self-defined notions of ‘national identity’ 
and ‘cultural values.’ Both officials and publics across 
the GCC states hence feel increasingly threatened 
by the pace of growth in populations that have nearly 
doubled (Bahrain), more than doubled (UAE) and even 
trebled (Qatar) as a result of mass inward migration 
over the past decade. Similar concern is also evident 
in public policy discourse in the other three GCC states 
of Kuwait, where non-nationals outnumber citizens by 
more than two to one, as well as in the more populous 
Saudi Arabia and Oman, where the larger number of cit-
izens vis-à-vis expatriates is counterbalanced by higher 
levels of local unemployment. 
While the demographic imbalance is such a prominent fea-
ture of domestic policy agendas across the GCC states, it 
is unlikely to narrow in the immediate or near future:
• Numerous initiatives are underway that aim to raise 
the educational and skill levels of GCC citizens 
through vocational training and qualification pro-
grammes, while the nationalisation of GCC states 
workforces has, on paper, been a declared policy ob-
jective in most GCC States since at least the 1980s. 
• And yet, GCC economies remain dependent on large 
numbers of low- and semi-skilled labourers filling po-
sitions that many GCC states nationals would be un-
willing to occupy. 
• Moreover, the paradox of sustained economic growth 
fuelled (quite literally) by consistently high oil prices 
since 2002 has seen GCC states reliance on foreign 
workers increase rather than decrease. 
Demand for labour has soared with the succession of 
mega-projects unveiled in the GCC states, notably in 
the UAE and in Qatar, alongside major infrastructural 
programmes in Saudi Arabia. With Dubai booming once 
again (following the downturn of 2009) and gearing up 
to host Expo 2020 and with Qatar embarking upon mas-
sive infrastructural spending ahead of the 2022 FIFA 
World Cup, the economic ‘push’ factors that underpin 
the demographic imbalance look set to intensify over 
the coming decade. 
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This policy dilemma has augmented the public percep-
tion of the demographic imbalance in the GCC states:
• Strategies to raise the operating cost for companies 
employing non-nationals has failed to discourage 
those firms from bringing in migrants as the overall 
cost of labour has not risen substantially. 
• Over the longer-term, the two most realistic policy 
options for reducing the number of expatriates are 
increasing the skill-sets of nationals and the full cost 
of migrants. 
• However, such policies fail to address the current 
concerns raised by many GCC states nationals who 
feel ‘surrounded’ by migrant labourers, and question 
their future role in GCC polities. 
Related issues of naturalisation and the ‘Bidoon’ (state-
less) communities remain highly sensitive for these rea-
sons (among others), with only the UAE going some way 
toward addressing them in a comprehensive manner. 
SPONSORSHIP AS A DEMOGRAPHIC POLICY 
Participants assessed the role of the sponsorship 
(‘kafala’) system as one of the main causes of the struc-
tural imbalances in GCC labour markets and the differ-
ential patterns of growth in the national/non-national 
workforce, as well as its role in shaping the size and 
dynamics of the GCC states’ populations. Among the 
issues discussed were how the kafala system facili-
tates the ease of importing foreign labourers, with 94 
per cent of Emirati households having a maid and each 
Kuwaiti household hosting an average of 2.3 domestic 
workers in 2013. Visa trafficking was another factor iden-
tified as sustaining high levels of labour importation with 
one participant noting that in 2003, the Saudi Minister 
of Labour estimated that some 70 per cent of all visas 
issued were subsequently sold on the black market. 
The concept of kafala emerged in the 1950s and has 
since evolved in different ways across the GCC states, 
typically balancing the relationships between nation-
als and immigrants, and between state and business 
interests. Prior to the 1950s, immigration flows had 
been managed through foreign oil companies such as 
Aramco (the Arabian-American Oil Company) or Bapco 
(the Bahrain Petroleum Company) which developed and 
organised hierarchies of labour with expatriates above 
nationals and large numbers of South Asian workers 
making their way to the GCC in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Today, migrants can only come to the GCC with a 
work permit through a kafeel (local sponsor), a policy 
intended to deter migrants from settling and seeking 
permanent residence. Kafala was first mentioned in 
Saudi Arabia’s 1950 Residency Law. The system then 
developed during the subsequent decade as national 
movements emerged as channels for demands for the 
employment of local labour and equal pay and status 
with expatriates:
• Until 2000, there was no limit on the number of kaf-
alas that a kafeel could have and cases persisted of 
the system being abused as the sponsor would ac-
cept a fee from the incoming migrant to be left to 
find his/her own way and employment. 
• Other instances of malpractice occurred when spon-
sors established ‘front’ companies to cover the im-
portation of migrants with ‘fake’ visas. 
The kafala system has underpinned the emergence of 
dual labour markets and a situation whereby citizens 
and expatriates tend not to compete for the same jobs, 
with nationals mostly employed in the public sector and 
non-nationals in the private sector. In mixed sectors, 
nationals typically receive higher salaries and enjoy 
better job security. This also has disconnected pro-
fessional advancement from economic productivity in 
many cases. 
Aside from reinforcing the co-existence of two large-
ly-separate labour markets in  the GCC states, the kafala 
system has also created ‘dual societies’ by concentrat-
ing employment into stratified occupations and banning 
expatriates from accessing the benefits of citizenship, 
which is, and remains, largely closed to non-nationals.
• The kafala system has enhanced the construction of 
the notion of citizenship as a privilege to be granted, 
rather than a right to be earned, while also privatis-
ing manpower as a means of production by allowing 
local sponsors to control and regulate the presence 
of foreigners. 
• This normally is the prerogative of the state rather 
than private individuals, and the sponsorship system 
therefore inserts a layer of middlemen as ‘sub-rentier’ 
intermediaries between the state and its expatriates.  
• Nevertheless, with the emergence of second and even 
third generation immigrants in GCC states societies, 
notions of identity and belonging are becoming blurred. 
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Meanwhile, the erosion of the barrier between dual 
labour markets, as relatively high levels of unemploy-
ment are increasingly driving GCC states nationals 
into taking unskilled jobs, is also placing under strain 
the system of kafala. Workshop participants agreed 
that a radical overhaul of the system was not merely 
unavoidable but was already taking place across the 
GCC states. 
EVOLVING ROLE OF NON-NATIONALS
GCC societies are being transformed by sweeping 
changes to the urban and spatial landscape of GCC 
states cities:
• The region has witnessed a prolonged real es-
tate boom since the early-2000s as governments 
launched a series of ‘mega city projects’ both in 
terms of creating new urban agglomerates based 
around specific industries or economic sectors and, 
in some states, by liberalising the real estate market 
and opening it up to foreign investors. 
• One GCC participant noted that the largest ten in-
vestment projects in the GCC states all involved real 
estate and cited the legal and regulatory changes in 
Bahrain, the UAE, Oman, and Qatar that have permit-
ted foreign ownership in selected areas. This has oc-
curred in tandem with the introduction of long-term 
residency visas linked to the acquisition of real estate 
in Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman (5 years) and the UAE 
(3 years). 
• Many of the ‘economic visions’ that form the corner-
stone of the GCC states’ post-oil diversification plans 
are geared toward becoming regional and interna-
tional hubs and capturing massive flows of foreign 
investment. 
Within this reformulation of GCC states cityscapes, new 
dynamics are emerging for many groups of non-nation-
als, who are seen as consumers, investors, and proper-
ty owners in addition to labourers. In the words of one 
participant, expatriates are ‘the agents that animate the 
city’ as they evolve into sources of demand and con-
sumption that in some cases surpass even the role of 
GCC citizens. One participant cited a 2009 household 
census in Dubai that indicated that national households 
totalled only 17.6 per cent of overall household expen-
diture while another stated that expatriates in Bahrain 
spend more on average than Bahraini citizens. In addi-
tion, expatriates provide important sources of revenue, 
particularly in polities such as Dubai or Bahrain that lack 
substantive oil reserves, through the levying of fees 
and indirect taxes on the non-national population. As 
these trends point to expatriates playing an ever-greater 
and more prominent role in GCC states societies, they 
raise a host of awkward public policy challenges as offi-
cials attempt to balance the enticement of higher-worth 
non-nationals with the reality that they will not ultimate-
ly be allowed to fully settle or integrate. 
There are thus layers of instability that run through the pro-
liferation of mega-projects aimed at expatriate audiences:
• One is the probability that GCC states citizens and 
expatriates ultimately will have diverging interests 
and may end up competing for scarce physical re-
sources as some of the most highly water and food-
stressed countries in the world attempt to sustain 
unprecedented population levels. 
• Another is the rising segmentation in urban space as 
gated communities introduce hierarchies where dif-
ferent groups of expatriates live, potentially leading 
to struggles for access to open spaces in the GCC 
states. 
• A third is the potentially problematic nature of the 
financial and free zones that have hitherto been the 
hubs for growth as they have also created alternative 
legal, judicial, and institutional frameworks that could 
almost be equated to parallel societies. 
Hence, studying the changing role of non-nationals 
raises important questions about the spatial, as well 
as demographic, reconfiguration of GCC societies, as 
non-nationals play a role that goes far beyond the mere 
provision of labour, especially in the smaller GCC states 
such as the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain.
ROLE OF BUSINESS ACTORS IN THE  
DEMOGRAPHY DEBATE
The role of business actors in the demography debate in 
the GCC is both under-explored and difficult to research. 
Over the past decades, business actors have driven the 
growth in employment of migrant labour; yet they do 
not conceive of themselves as political actors with a 
stake in the public policy debate. While local business-
people do have more of a recognised role in GCC states 
parliaments, a lot of their influence over legislatures 
appears to be informal, quite opaque, and difficult to 
map. There is thus an analytical gap in tracing how busi-
ness interests manifest themselves in actual policy, 
with clear implications for GCC states decision-makers 
as they attempt to confront repeated failures to address 
the demographic imbalance in the GCC states. 
ADDRESSING  THE DEMOGRAPHIC IMBALANCE IN THE GULF STATES 7
Policy dilemmas reflect a conflict of interest between 
business and political stakeholders in the GCC:
• Governments feel the need to provide jobs to citi-
zens for social and political reasons, consistent with 
the broader expectation of the state as an economic 
provider and redistributor of resources. 
• Business actors, however, have an interest in main-
taining the low-cost labour base provided by migrant 
workers. 
There is very little open or public acknowledgment 
of the gap between different policy aims which nev-
ertheless act to undermine each other – notably, the 
inherent tension between economic interests and polit-
ical demands to create jobs for nationals and moving 
toward sustainable economic diversification. The Abu 
Dhabi Vision 2030 plan does attempt to overcome 
this dilemma by reversing the current breakdown of 
the expatriate population, which consists primarily of 
unskilled labourers, so that by 2030 a target of 80 per 
cent of non-nationals will be skilled. 
Recent initiatives to reform labour markets in Bahrain 
provide an illustration of how the diverse objectives 
among different groups of stakeholders have come out 
into the open. In contrast to earlier policy responses that 
focused on setting regulations on the use of migrant 
labour and quotas on employment for nationals without 
producing the desired results, Bahrain experimented 
with changing the structure of incentives by adjusting 
the cost gap between the employment of nationals and 
non-nationals. This represented an attempt to overcome 
the reluctance to employ citizens of the GCC states as 
it raised operating costs for businesses. However, busi-
ness elites saw the issue very differently, and viewed 
the mandate to employ more nationals over expatriates 
as a cost that was imposed rather than an opportunity 
to be grasped. 
Other participants noted how recent developments in 
Saudi Arabia have shown that GCC states governments 
can in fact overrule business protests with only limited 
backlash:
• For decades, business interests had successfully 
stymied reforms to labour markets but after some 
initial organised resistance, caved in to government 
changes to the quota system. This suggests there is 
something new about the parameters of business 
lobbying as it works only in the absence of political 
will, and on occasions where the Royal Court com-
mits to reform it is far harder to reverse. 
• With policy responses to the Arab Spring injecting 
a powerful new political rationale for reform, there 
was nothing like the organised campaign of business 
resistance that defeated an attempt by then-Minister 
of Labour Ghazi al-Gosaibi to reform the visa system 
in 2003. 
INTERACTION OF LABOUR AND POLITICS
Recent changes to the labour market in Bahrain fall 
into three categories – changes to union laws, chang-
es to policies of labour nationalisation, and changes to 
the kafala system. As all three examples of reform are 
inherently political issues that will require in-depth sup-
port from key ministries, this complicates their imple-
mentation in practice. Close policy coordination is thus 
a precondition for the successful application of reform 
initiatives. 
Bahrain has a long record of labour activism, with 
the right to establish unions forming part of popular 
demands in the 1950s and 1970s, and receiving offi-
cial recognition in 2001, following reforms initiated by 
King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa. The first decree legalis-
ing unions allowed for the creation of a single umbrella 
organisation, the General Federation of Bahrain Trade 
Unions (GFBTU), which permitted only one union per 
industry or organisation. Subsequently, unions started 
to emerge across a range of industries, and by that 
year, over 33,000 workers were registered in 70 unions. 
When protests broke out across Bahrain in February 
2011, the unions played an instrumental role in mobil-
ising the local workforce, with the GFBTU calling for a 
general strike on 20 February, which received support 
from numerous professional organisations: 
• An estimated 80 per cent of workers did not turn up 
for work on the day of the strike due both to worker 
participation and a general deterioration in security. 
A heavy-handed response to workers participating in 
the general strike led the GFTBU to call for a second 
general strike on 14 March 2011. 
• In the months that followed, a total of 4539 workers 
from the public and private sectors were suspended 
or dismissed from their jobs and although many were 
reinstated following the Bahrain Independent Com-
mission of Inquiry, about 400 were not. 
• In addition, a new labour law was passed in 2012 
which altered the ability of the GFBTU to mobilise 
on such a large scale again, and legislation allowing 
for the creation of multiple trade unions led to the 
creation of more ‘pro-government’ bodies that effec-
tively diluted the power of the labour movement. 
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• Moreover, the Bahrain Labour Union Free Federation 
(BLUFF) was established to counter the GFBTU.
Changes also have been made to policies of labour 
nationalisation. Attempts to promote ‘Bahrainisation’ 
extend back to the 1980s and were successful in the 
public sector but a failure in the private sector, which 
actually witnessed a decline in the number of Bahraini 
workers from 33 per cent in 1981 to a current level 
of 24 per cent. The Labour Market Regulation Author-
ity (LMRA), established in 2006, imposed a flat fee 
of 200 Bahraini Dinars (BD) on every expatriate hired 
(for a two-year visa) plus an additional fee of BD10 per 
month. However, in April 2011, the LMRA suspended 
the foreign worker levy in an effort to soften the impact 
of the uprising in Bahrain on local businesses. The levy 
was partially reintroduced at a lower fee in August 2013 
as part of a wider Labour Ministry announcement that 
the ministry was moving toward a more qualitative 
nationalisation scheme in the private sector focusing 
on job quality and providing proper training and skills to 
Bahraini citizens. It is likely that strategies to overhaul 
‘Bahrainisation’ policies will be reviewed across a range 
of sectors in a drive to raise the participation of Bahraini 
citizens in the workforce. 
The third element of reform in Bahrain is in the kafala 
system. Foreign workers have been granted the right to 
switch employers after a year of employment, with or 
without the permission of their employer; in the past, 
such permission was required. 
• Nevertheless, employers still retain the preroga-
tive to cancel foreign labourers’ contracts and send 
them home. 
• Moreover, the reforms do not apply to domestic 
workers and also fall short of resolving the ‘free visa’ 
system, which constitutes arguably the most pro-
nounced shortcoming in the labour market. A ‘free 
visa’ is a travel permit that allows the holder to enter 
the country but does not provide the individual with 
employment, accommodation, or mandatory health 
insurance. 
• This issue has caused a major distortion in labour 
markets as there are an estimated 50,000 ‘free visa’ 
holders in Bahrain and requires in-depth support of 
numerous ministries to work together to make prog-
ress on addressing the issue. 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Workshop participants took a view of the demographic 
imbalance as a set of interconnected policy challenges 
that run through political, economic, and social struc-
tures in the GCC states. The existence of diverging sets 
of interests creates policy dilemmas that are not easily 
resolved, as evidenced in the failure of successive 
labour nationalisation initiatives to reduce either the 
absolute or relative numbers of expatriates in the GCC 
states workforces. Nevertheless, in a politicised ‘post-Ar-
ab Spring’ context, it is important for the formulation not 
only of sound public policy but also for medium- and long-
term prospects of social cohesion more generally, that:
• Governments across the GCC identify and imple-
ment measures to move toward sustainable long-
term economic growth. Shifting from a comparative 
advantage in oil or gas toward a competitive advan-
tage in human capital is a critical component of the 
transformation of the GCC states economies, under-
pinned by policies to enhance the skill-levels of GCC 
states nationals and increase their representation in 
the workforce. 
• Policy-makers and other political and economic 
stakeholders identify a balance among competing in-
terests and perspectives that matches short-term re-
quirements with broader reforms to economies and 
labour markets, through a comprehensive approach 
that examines demographic issues in their totality 
and not merely through the lens of labour national-
isation or labour market reform. 
• Officials in the GCC states acknowledge that greater 
access to comprehensive statistics and more reliable 
data is needed as a matter of policy urgency in order 
to take the heat (and the uncertainty) out of public 
and policy debates and also to enable stakeholders 
to better target incremental reforms to existing eco-
nomic and political structures.
• Attempts must be made to defuse the highly-charged 
atmosphere of political and public discourse on the 
‘demographic imbalance’ in the Gulf so as to balance 
consideration of genuinely felt concerns with aware-
ness of the areas in which the relationship between 
expatriates and their host societies has been – and can 
remain – mutually beneficial to both sets of groups. 
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